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I. INTRODUCTION
During the opening ceremony of the 1996 Atlanta Olympics, the popular
German-American world music band Enigma performed the theme song
for the event, “Return to Innocence.” As the song resounded in millions of
homes worldwide, members of the Amis tribe in Taiwan identified it as
resembling a folk song that formed an integral part of their upbringing and
culture. Consequently, Enigma, Capitol-EMI Music, and Virgin Records
were sued collectively for a hefty amount in royalties in U.S. district court.
Eventually the parties reached an out of court settlement compelling
Enigma to acknowledge the Amis people’s contribution to the song.1
*
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However, this is only a single fortunate case among hundreds of instances
of cultural misappropriation that traditional communities suffer every day.
Over the last two decades, the cultural rights of indigenous peoples have
received increasing attention from the United Nations and, with the
adoption of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,2 have
been recognized internationally as fundamental human rights.3 Traditional
communities around the world regularly confront issues of cultural
appropriation and cultural theft—be it through the fusion of traditional
music with digital beats to produce chart-topping pop music albums,
traditional painting techniques, and handicrafts mass-produced by nontraditional means and sold as authentic, indigenous art being replicated on
clothing, footwear, and carpets, or indigenous words and names being
trademarked and used commercially.
The protection against such
exploitation of traditional writings, languages, customs, songs, paintings,
handicrafts, rituals and ceremonies, traditional medical knowledge, legends
and myths, referred to collectively as traditional cultural expressions
(“TCE”) or “folklore,”4 has emerged as an aspect of the cultural and
intellectual property rights of indigenous people and is a key issue in the
international arena.

Intellectual Property Law in India and Dr. Jolly Bagchi, singer, musician, and an expert
on mass and folk songs from Bengal for her untiring discussions, suggestions, and
articles on folk music. The authors also thank the organizers of the “IP/Gender: The
Unmapped Connections” conference at the Washington College of Law, March 2007,
for the opportunity to present this work, and to the participants of the conference for
their feedback and encouragement.
1. See Nancy Guy, Abstract, Regaining Their Voices: Music, Cultural Ownership,
and the Amis’ Copyright Struggle, in COPYRIGHT: WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO OWN THE
MUSIC?, available at http://orpheus.tamu.edu/pmssem/ copyright.html (noting that
Enigma initially neither mentioned the tribe’s contribution nor paid any of its huge
profits to the tribe).
2. See U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Hum. Rts. Council
Res. 2006/2 (recognizing and reaffirming collective, indispensable rights that
indigenous peoples possess, including the right to protect their cultural traditions).
3. Id. art. 12.
4. United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization General
Conference, Oct. 17 – Nov. 15, 1989, Recommendation on the Safeguarding of
Traditional Culture and Folklore, 239, available at http://www.unesco.org/culture/laws
/paris/html_eng/page1.shtml, 25 C/Resolutions + CORR. [hereinafter UNESCO
Recommendation] (explaining that
[f]olklore (or traditional and popular culture) is the totality of tradition-based
creations of a cultural community, expressed by a group or individuals and
recognized as reflecting the expectations of a community in so far as they
reflect its cultural and social identity; its standards and values are transmitted
orally, by imitation or by other means. Its forms are, among others, language,
literature, music, dance, games, mythology, rituals, customs, handicrafts,
architecture and other arts.
).
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Developments in technology and the ease with which mass reproduction,
broadcast, and distribution can be carried out in the digital era greatly
increase the exploitation of folklore, which is expropriated blatantly and
commercialized to suit the needs of the market. The economic interests of
indigenous communities suffer because no monetary returns from
commercial exploitation of the cultural property are given to the traditional
groups that develop and maintain it.5 The impact of such action is
heightened further regarding developing countries, which are very rich in
folklore but have particularly weak systems of intellectual and cultural
property protection.6 The situation in India is particularly complex, as the
Indian government refuses to recognize traditional artisan communities or
custodians of traditional knowledge and folklore as “indigenous” peoples.7
India’s labor-intensive handicrafts trade, basically a cottage industry, is
dispersed widely—located mainly in rural areas—and is the largest
employer in the unorganized labor sector. Behind the huge industry are
millions of artisans who create the Indian handicrafts that are unique and
immediately identifiable in the global market. In this paper, the authors
study three specific cultural expressions generated by women in traditional
communities located in the eastern part of India and the exploitation
suffered by each. The first is the case of the kantha-stitch industry in West
Bengal8 and Bangladesh, which is a specific kind of decorative embroidery
done only by the women of Bengal.9 The kantha-stitch industry has
emerged as a highly lucrative industry, operating as an informal sector in
India.10 However, over time fashion designers have come to stylize and
innovatively apply the kantha technique on all kinds of apparel and
accessories that are immensely popular in the market, thus, grossing
millions for the fashion industry. The women who create the exquisite
patterns, after laboring for days, however, receive meager remuneration
and no recognition for their art. This is a classic instance of exploitation of
traditional cultural expression that brings into sharp focus the issues of

5. P. Kher, Towards Folklore Protection 2005 (30) PTC J-9 at J-10.
6. Id.
7. See Virginius Xaxa, Tribes as Indigenous People of India, 34 ECON. & POL.

WKLY. 3589, 3590 (1999) (discussing the indifference of the Indian government to the
use of the term “indigenous” prior to the international recognition of the rights of
indigenous people, and stating that the government now only approves of the term
“indigenous” in rare circumstances, when referring to “people that have been subjected
to domination and subjugation”).
8. A state located in the east of India, sharing borders with Bangladesh.
9. After the Partition of India in 1947, the Province of Bengal was divided into
East Bengal (which later became the country of Bangladesh) and West Bengal, a state
in the Union of India.
10. See generally Ulan Switucha, Nakshi Kantha: A Study Group Presentation, 12
TEXTILE SOCIETY OF HONG KONG 7 (2004).
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ownership and authorship of indigenous intellectual property.
The second TCE this Article analyzes is the Madhubani painting—one
of the most widely exported art products from India. The Madhubani is a
distinctive kind of painting using line drawings and vegetable dyes created
by rural women from the Chota Nagpur Plateau and Chattisgarh areas in
the state of Bihar located in eastern India.11 Apart from the problem of
artistic non-recognition, as in the case of the kantha industry, the threat of
fakes is paramount in this instance because cheap imitations flood both
domestic and international markets.
Finally, this Article explores the issue of commercial exploitation of
TCE in the area of folk music, illustrating the problem by focusing on
contemporary Bengali pop, which is based largely on blatant
misappropriation of folk tunes and songs. The core of the problem in the
case of folk music protection, unlike in folk art, is the absence of fixation,
leading to mutilation and distortion of folk music apart from nonrecognition of folk artists. Issues of moral rights and duration of protection
are problems that find relevance in each of the areas described above.
This Article argues that the existing regime of intellectual property is
grossly inadequate for protecting traditional cultural expressions, and must
be suitably expanded to incorporate a human rights understanding to fully
accommodate the interests of traditional and indigenous communities.
Secondly, although the protection of intellectual property rights for
indigenous communities has been read into indigenous peoples’ rights in
international human rights instruments, and has also been addressed by
specific declarations of indigenous peoples,12 these protections are not
suitable for the Indian experience because the Indian government does not
recognize traditional Indian artisan communities as indigenous peoples.
Finally, even if intellectual property laws granted TCEs appropriate
protection, the traditional knowledge and cultural expressions of women
within patriarchal traditional communities would still remain unrecognized
and unrewarded. Therefore, this Article asserts that any legal or
11. See generally Jagdish J. Chavda, The Narrative Paintings of India’s Jitwarpuri
Women, 11 WOMAN’S ART J. 26 (1990).
12. See John Hunter & Chris Jones, Bioprospecting and Indigenous Knowledge in
Australia: Valuing Indigenous Spiritual Knowledge and Its Implications for Intergrated
Legal Regimes, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
LAW, available at http://law.wustl.edu/centeris/Papers/Biodiversity/PDFWrdDoc/
HunterJonesfinaldraft.doc (quoting the Julayinbul Statement on Indigenous Intellectual
Property Rights (1993)); see also HUM. RTS. COUNCIL RES. 2006/2, supra note 2;
International Consultation on Intellectual Property Rights and Biodiversity, Sept. 30,
1994,
available
at
http://www/austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AILR/2001/11.html
[hereinafter ICIPRB]; First Int’l Conference on the Cultural & Intellectual Property
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Whakatane, N.Z., June 12-18, 1993, The Mataatua
Declaration on the Cultural and Intellectual Property Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
preamble [hereinafter Mataatua Declaration].
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institutional framework developed to address this issue must accord due
recognition to the contribution of women within the community towards
their own creations.
II. LOCATING CULTURAL RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE WITHIN THE
HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK
A. International Human Rights Law and the Indigenous
The issue of cultural and intellectual property rights of indigenous
communities has received increasing global attention due to a focus by the
United Nations on this area in the last twenty-five years.13 The area of
TCE protection is of particular significance because this is the only form of
intellectual property for which protection has been sought under the human
rights framework as well. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”) and the World Intellectual Property
Organization (“WIPO”) have been addressing the ways in which the art and
cultural expressions of indigenous peoples can be granted international
protection by modifying the international intellectual property regime. In
addition, the right of indigenous peoples to protect and own their cultural
property has been read into a number of associated human rights addressed
in various international instruments.
Cultural Rights of Minorities—The first of these is the Cultural Rights
of Minorities, recognized under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, enacted in 1966, which provides that: “In those States in
which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to
such minorities shall not be deprived of the right, in community with other
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice
their own religion or to use their own language.”14
Right to Self-Identification—The International Labor Organization
(“ILO”) Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in
Independent Countries,15 adopted in 1991, called attention to the distinctive

13. The United Nations has made a series of efforts to address this issue since it set
up the Working Group on Indigenous Peoples in 1982. See, e.g., MODEL PROVISIONS
FOR NATIONAL LAWS ON THE PROTECTION OF EXPRESSION OF FOLKLORE AGAINST
ILLICIT EXPLOITATION AND OTHER PREJUDICIAL ACTIONS (United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Org. & World Intellectual Property Org. 1985), available at
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0006/000637/063799eb.pdf [hereinafter UNESCOWIPO Model Provisions]; Hum. Rts. Council Res. 2006/2, supra note 2.
14. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 27, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 [hereinafter ICCPR].
15. See Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent
Countries, ILO Conv. 169, entered into force Sept. 5, 1991, art. 8, reprinted in 28
I.L.M. 1382 (1989), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/ instree/r1citp.htm.
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contribution of indigenous peoples to cultural diversity16 and affirmed the
indigenous peoples’ right to self-identification.17 The Convention asserted
that this right to self-identification includes the rights of indigenous peoples
to their intangible cultural, scientific, and intellectual resources.18
Right of Indigenous People to Self-Determination—The First
International Conference on the Cultural and Intellectual Property Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, convened by the nine Tribes of Mataatua in New
Zealand in 1993, resulted in the Mataatua Declaration on the Cultural and
Intellectual Property Rights of Indigenous Peoples (“Declaration”).19 This
instrument asserted that protection of the rights of indigenous peoples with
respect to their traditional knowledge, cultural expressions, and all other
forms of cultural property was an aspect of the right to self-determination.20
The Declaration affirmed that indigenous populations have the
fundamental right to define and control their traditional and cultural
knowledge, but provided that as long as the international community
guaranteed and upheld this right, they will offer the benefits of their
traditional knowledge to all humanity.21
Right to Practice Cultural Traditions—The promulgation of a
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples resulted from the United
Nations International Year for the World’s Indigenous Peoples. Article 12
of the Declaration recognizes the right of indigenous peoples to practice
and revitalize their cultural traditions and customs, including the right
. . . to maintain, protect and develop the past, present and future
manifestations of their cultures, such as . . . artifacts, designs,
ceremonies, technologies and visual and performing arts and literature,
as well as the right to the restitution of cultural, intellectual, religious and
spiritual property taken without their free and informed consent or in
violation of their laws, traditions and customs.22

Article 29 of the Declaration further recognizes the entitlement of
indigenous peoples “to the full ownership, control and protection of their
cultural and intellectual property.”23 This is the first international
16. Id. preamble.
17. Id. art. 1(2).
18. Id. art. 23 (recognizing that the right of indigenous peoples to maintain their

culture and to achieve economic self-reliance and development is a fundamental human
right).
19. Mataatua Declaration, supra note 12 (listing Japan, Australia, Cook Islands,
Fiji, India, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Surinam, and the United States as attendees).
20. Id. preamble.
21. Id.
22. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Working Group on Indigenous
Populations, Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, art. 12, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add.1 (1994).
23. Id. art. 29.
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convention to specifically articulate the cultural rights of indigenous people
as integral human rights.
The recognition of cultural rights of indigenous peoples in international
human rights documents represents the global shift in perception,
acknowledging the dangers of distorting indigenous cultural systems by
adjusting them to the prevailing intellectual property regime. Further, it
reflects the significance of adequate protection of cultural property to the
social and economic lives of indigenous communities. However, despite
these efforts to recognize the cultural integrity and cultural autonomy of
indigenous peoples as human rights, and parallel attempts by UNESCO and
WIPO to protect TCEs through international conventions, the intellectual
property of indigenous peoples continues to be vulnerable to
misappropriation. This failure of existing intellectual property regimes to
protect indigenous interests may be attributed to the fact that intellectual
property laws in general, and copyright laws in particular, do not
incorporate a human rights understanding in their present form—especially
in relation to indigenous populations—and are, in fact, antithetical to a
human rights paradigm in many respects.
B. The “Indigenous” in India
The term “indigenous” describes tribes or semi-tribal populations in
independent countries who lived in the country prior to colonization or
conquest by immigrants from outside the country or geographical region in
question.24 These populations became increasingly marginalized after the
conquest, which gradually led these people to develop particular social,
economic, and cultural lifestyles distinct from those of the national
mainstream. Due to these distinctive traits, the application of generic
domestic legislation does not suit such populations in the present day.
Conceptualized in such terms, locating the indigenous in India is difficult.
Many adivasis,25 as the indigenous are understood in India, were not the
original settlers of the regions in which they are found now. It is also
difficult to make the claim that they were the only original inhabitants of
India prior to the arrival of Aryans and that they have never migrated.26
Furthermore, not all of these communities have been marginalized or
subjugated by the mainstream population, and the immigrant colonial
populations that initially dominated some of these groups are no longer
present. Hence there exists significant academic debate in India regarding
the usage of the term “indigenous” and corresponding non-recognition of
24. Xaxa, supra note 7, at 3590.
25. The term literally means “the first settlers” in Hindi—the national language of

India.
26. Xaxa, supra note 7, at 3591.
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the same under domestic law. As a result, despite the cultural and
intellectual property rights of indigenous peoples finding recognition in
international human rights instruments and in specific declarations of
indigenous people, the application of these instruments in the Indian
context is problematic.
III. COMMUNITY INTERESTS V. THE COPYRIGHT REGIME: A CLASH OF
IDEOLOGIES
In the understanding of aboriginal, indigenous, or native peoples, or the
“Fourth World” as some have collectively christened them,27 intellectual
property rights are rooted in a concept of collective or communal
intellectual property existing in perpetuity.28 In other words, such rights
are not limited to the life of an individual creator plus some arbitrary
number of years after his or her death. To the indigenous peoples, a song,
story, icon, or artwork does not belong to an individual but to the group as
a collective whole determined by the customary laws of collective
ownership of cultural property.29 Unlike the Western system, regulation of
intellectual property creation and use within indigenous groups is not based
on notions of individual talent and expression, but instead stems from a
system of inherited rights and obligations.
Unlike the Third World, indigenous nations do not constitute “States,”
and as a result, they seldom participate on the international stage.
Nonetheless, in 1994, indigenous peoples made efforts on an international
platform to draft an instrument for the protection of these groups in the
form of the International Covenant on the Rights of Indigenous Nations,
which attempted to articulate a distinctive Fourth World approach to
intellectual property rights. Despite this attempt, folkloric rights continue
to have no standing in the international courts.30 Typically, therefore,
indigenous peoples have sought to protect folklore under the framework of
intellectual property, within which they have considered copyright laws
best suited to protect traditional cultural expressions.31 However, as several
27. See generally GEORGE MANUEL, THE FOURTH WORLD: AN INDIAN REALITY
(1974) (using for the first time the term “Fourth World” to define “the indigenous
peoples descended from a country’s aboriginal population and who today are
completely or partly deprived of the right to their own territories and its riches”).
28. Harry Hillman Chartrand, Intellectual Property in the Global Village, 1 GOV’T
INFO. IN CAN., 1995, available at http://library2.usask.ca/gic/v1n4/chartrand/chartrand.
html.
29. Id.
30. Posting of Harry Hillman Chartrand to Intellectual Property Law Server,
Copyright And The New World Economic Order, http://www.intelproplaw.com/Copy
right/Forum/msg/498.shtml (last visted July 3, 1999).
31. See, e.g., KAMIL IDRIS, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION
[WIPO], MINDING CULTURE: CASE-STUDIES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
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authors have argued, the copyright regime in its present form is illequipped to serve the interests of indigenous communities due to
fundamental differences between the Western understanding of
“protection” and the indigenous understanding of the same.32 While
indigenous works are not excluded entirely from protection under the
present copyright regime, it does not give them any kind of special
protection either. As of now, folk music, folk art, and other forms of
folklore do not find special mention in any copyright statute in the world.33
The Indian Copyright Act of 1957 is no different in this regard. As
illustrated below, the interests of traditional Indian communities in
protecting their folklore clearly differ from the underlying precepts of the
existing copyright law.
A. Authorship and Ownership
Authorship and ownership are distinct concepts under copyright law and
ownership of copyright in a work is independent of the ownership of the
physical material in which the work is fixed. The basic rule of ownership
of literary, musical, or artistic property is that the author34 is the first owner
of copyright in the work.35 This rule is subject to certain exceptions,36 none
TRADITIONAL CULTURAL EXPRESSIONS 10 (2003), available at http://www.wipo.int/tk/
en/studies/cultural/minding-culture/studies/finalstudy.pdf; see also Yumbulul v.
Aboriginal Artists Agency Ltd. (1991) 21 I.P.R. 481. See generally Milpurrurru v.
Indofurn Party Ltd. (1994) 54 F.C.R. 240 (Austl.).
32. See generally Kamal Puri, Preservation and Conservation of Expression of
Folklore, in 4 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: CRITICAL CONCEPTS IN LAW 511
(David Vaver ed., Routledge 2006); Kher, supra note 5; G.C. O’Donnell, A Short Note
on Anti-Copyright, AUSTRALIAN COPYRIGHT COUNCIL (1985).
33. See India Copyright Act, No. 14 of 1957; India Code (1957), § 13.1 (ruling that
copyright subsists in: (1) original literary, dramatic, musical, and artistic works;
(2) cinematograph films; and (3) sound recordings).
34. See id. § 2(d) (defining “author:” (1) in relation to literary or dramatic work, the
author of the work; (2) in relation to musical work, the composer; (3) in relation to
artistic work, other than a photograph, the artist; (4) in relation to cinematograph film,
the producer; (5) in relation to photograph, the person who takes the photograph; (6) in
relation to sound recording, the producer; and (7) in relation to any literary, dramatic,
musical, or artistic work, which is computer-generated, the person who causes the work
to be created); see also 9 HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND 548 (Butterworths, 4th ed.
1973) (defining “author” as the person who actually writes, compiles, composes, or
draws the work in question, although the idea of the work may have been suggested by
another).
35. India Copyright Act, No. 14 of 1957; India Code (1957) § 17.
36. See id. § 17(a)-(c) (stating the following exceptions to the author as first owner
of copyright rule: (1) literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works made in the course of
employment under a contract of service or a contract for service; (2) artistic works and
cinematographic films made at the instance of any person or as against valuable
consideration; (3) speeches delivered in public; and (4) government works and public
works); see also Vicco Labs v. Art Commerica Adver. Pvt. Ltd. (2001) 7 S.C.C. 81, 93
(India) (asserting that, in India, copyright or ownership rights in respect of any work
created by another can be claimed only when the author creates it either in the course of
employment, as an agent, at the instance of the claimant, or if the claimant has paid
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of which apply in the case of indigenous folklore. This basic rule is in
stark contrast to customary practices of native artisan communities because
indigenous artists traditionally do not sign their work.37 According to
customary indigenous laws, a work created by one member usually is
owned by the entire tribe or group, through an operation of collective
ownership.38 The concept of “joint authorship” does exist in Indian
copyright law,39 but one cannot apply it in the case of indigenous cultural
property because such works are usually not a collaborative effort in which
the contribution of one author can be separated from the other, but instead,
it is something of a cumulative knowledge that finds expression over
generations.
In India, one example of blatant misappropriation of traditional
communities’ intellectual property is that of clothing and draperies made
by rural women using the kantha needlework. The misappropriation takes
place as a consequence of the inadequate protection afforded by the
copyright laws of the country. The kantha originated as a form of rough
embroidery on blankets made of varying sizes and pieces of cloth held
together by the simple running stitch for wrapping or laying down new
born babies or as a wrap for adults. Rural women outline patterns in black
chain stitch and then fill in with running stitch in a different color.40
Kantha motifs traditionally reflect rural scenes, such as birds, flowers,
wedding ceremonies, mythologies, and legends. The variation in style
comes with the different ways in which the artists embroider the running
stitch. Even today the stitching pattern and embroidery styles of kantha
weavers in Bangladesh and West Bengal are significantly unique and
identifiable. That speaks for the levels of sophistication of the art.41 A
cultural expression generated exclusively by women, kantha was never
made for money, and its commercial use is a recent phenomenon.42
Gradually, entrepreneurs from urban Bengal recognized the market for
such ethnic goods and started buying the products from rural households.
Several urban groups trained rural women in this craft who had little or no
urban education and, over the course of time, it became a form of gainful
valuable consideration for the said work).
37. Puri, supra note 32, at 522.
38. Id.
39. See India Copyright Act, No. 14 of 1957; India Code (1957), Preliminary § 2(z)
(defining “work of joint authorship” as a work produced by the collaboration of two or
more authors in which the contribution of one author is not distinct from the
contribution of other author or authors).
40. JOHN GILLOW & BRYAN SENTANCE, WORLD TEXTILES 163 (2005).
41. See generally Ulan Switucha, Nakshi Kantha – A Study Group Presentation, 12
TEXTILE SOC’Y OF HONG KONG 7 (Summer 2004).
42. SashaWorld.com, Kantha, http://www.sashaworld.com/family/kantha.htm (last
visited Oct. 31, 2007).
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economic employment for these women.43
The flip side of this development, however, is that women have lost
control over the entire craft of kantha. It gradually has emerged as an
industry wherein urban designers and traders determine virtually every
detail from designs and color schemes to marketing. Women now produce
on a mass scale and also cater to specific demands made by an urban upper
middle class clientele. Kantha embroidered apparel and artifacts exported
on a global scale by government agencies and private entrepreneurs
showcase Indian culture, but with heavy costs. Women producers not only
receive a mere fraction of the huge profits, but traditional motifs and styles
of stitching that typified kantha are giving way rapidly to urban designs.
Fortunately, the art does not run the risk of dying. On the contrary, kantha
products remain extremely popular. In this case, the crux of the problem is
that the women who produce the products do not sign their work, in
accordance with tradition. With the author of the work unknown, it
becomes impossible to protect the interests of such authors under the
existing copyright regime because first ownership of copyright devolves
upon the author of the work, to whom all economic rights flowing from the
copyright then accrue. As a result of this artistic non-recognition, kantha
artisans are reduced to mere trained weavers producing made-to-order
products. Under the existing copyright regime, women of rural Bengal
cannot conceive of claiming ownership rights over this artistic expression
and have to be satisfied with minimal economic gains.
B. Originality of Expression
The requirement of originality that exists in copyright law44 creates
another hurdle for the protection of traditional cultural expressions within
this system. Indian copyright statutes do not define the term “originality;”
however, judicial opinions indicate that copyright’s standard of originality
relates to the expression of creative thought, and not to the thought itself.45
While qualification as an “original composition” does not entail confining
the work to a field that has not been traversed hitherto by any other person,
such work must not appear to be copied from another work, and must
clearly originate from the author.46
However, any form of folklore usually draws from pre-existing tradition
43. Id.
44. India Copyright Act, No. 14 of 1957; India Code (1957) § 13.1.
45. See 9 HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND ¶ 831 (Butterworths, 4th ed. 1973)

(“Copyright Acts are not concerned with the originality of ideas, but with the
expression of thought”); see also R.G. Anand v. M/S. Deluxe Films, A.I.R. 1978 S.C.
1613, 1618; Univ. of London Press, Ltd. v. Univ. Tutorial Press, Ltd. [1916] 2 Ch. 601,
608 (U.K.).
46. Univ. of London Press, [1916] 2 Ch. at 609.

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2008

11

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 2

268

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 16:2

and, in fact, folkloric works fundamentally are based on, and gain value
from, the transmission of themes from one generation to another. Unlike
the testing for novelty in patent law, the requirement of originality for
copyright protection is significantly more complex to establish. Generally,
courts seek to determine two factors: first, the work must emanate from the
author and not be a copy,47 and second, the author must have exercised a
modicum of “skill, judgment or labor in making the compilation.”48
Nonetheless, these tests cannot be applied universally, and the
requirement of originality operates differently in the context of artistic
works, where it would be “palpably erroneous” to apply the “skill, labor
and judgment” standard.49 When measured against the foregoing analysis,
it appears that indigenous cultural expressions may not meet the traditional
requirement of originality of expression as it is understood under classic
copyright law. For instance, depictions of events and characters drawn
from Hindu mythology form recurring themes in most Madhubani
paintings in India. The expression of these themes, for which protection is
sought under copyright law, involves the use of specific techniques
common to all Madhubani artists, techniques that characterize Madhubani
art and impart to it its exotic uniqueness.
Madhubani, which literally means “forest of honey,” is a small village in
India in the northern part of the eastern state of Bihar. The distinctive
painting style developed by local indigenous artists from that area came to
be known by the same name.50 The painters use a completely natural
process involving paper treated with cow dung and natural colors.
Most Madhubani painters are women, and it is through these paintings
that they keep alive their unique local customs, folklore, and traditions.51
Women across castes create these paintings, which has given rise to
distinctive schools within the Madhubani community—such as Brahmin,
Kayasth, and Tattoo, each of which has its peculiar color schemes, motifs,
and formats.52
47. See id. (explaining that the Copyright Acts require that a work originates from
the author).
48. Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. v. William Hill (Football) Ltd., [1964] 1 All E.R. 465,
469 (H.L. 1964).
49. Interlego A.G. v. Tyco Indus. Inc., [1989] A.C. 217 (P.C. 1988) (appeal taken
from H.K.).
50. See generally YVES VÉQUAUD, THE WOMEN PAINTERS OF MITHILA (Thames &
Hudson 1977) (providing a detailed history of Madhubani art); MULK RAJ ANAND,
MADHUBANI PAINTING (Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Gov’t of India 1984).
51. See JYOTINDRA JAIN, GANGA DEVI: TRADITION AND EXPRESSION IN MITHILA
PAINTING 9 (Grantha Corp. 1997) (discussing prominent women artists who gained
repute for creating Madhubani paintings on paper including Ganga Devi, Mahasundari
Devi, Sita Devi, and Bani Devi).
52. See VÉQUAUD, supra note 50, at 25-31 (noting the differential use of colors that
distinguishes the work of women from different castes). The tradition of one Indian
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The art is intertwined with the religious beliefs of the communities as the
paintings originally were created exclusively by women on the mud walls
and floors of their homes during various auspicious occasions, mainly
wedding ceremonies. It was only later, around 1966-1968, that women
began to commercialize their art.53 Women started painting on handmade
paper, which was easily available, and the commercial potential of
Madhubani gradually was realized.54
Because the Madhubani technique primarily involves the use of line
drawings filled in with natural dyes, such designs are comparatively easy to
replicate. For this reason, cheap copies of such paintings made on plain
paper with chemical color have flooded the market, to the extent that they
are now even replicated on a variety of household goods and apparel.
These copies are painted by anyone but the authentic Madhubani women
painters, and in some cases are machine-printed and mass-produced. Yet
even as their cultural expressions are expropriated and exploited in the
market, the original Madhubani women remain unknown, with no legal
claim over their intellectual property and no legal recourse to prevent the
wrongful commercial exploitation thereof.
C. Fixation and Moral Rights
Copyright laws preclude copyright protection for oral works, which can
only be granted when the work is “fixed” in material or tangible form.55
But many forms of TCEs exist only in the form of the collective memory of
indigenous groups—e.g., folk songs and folktales. Although the real
caste, the Kayastha, consists of paintings in just black or deep red, which is the unique
feature of this school. Id. The Kayastha style basically emerged from the practice of
creating elaborate wall paintings in nuptial chambers. Id. Traditional motifs include
representations of the lotus plant, bamboo grove, fish, tortoises, parrots, birds, and all
that symbolize fertility. Id. Even when conceived on paper, single color line work
continues to define the Kayastha style of painting today. Id. Unlike the Kayastha, the
Brahmin style of painting deals lavishly with a rich variety of colors. Id. As the
uppermost caste, their easy access to sacred Hindu literature enables the rich portrayal
of Hindu iconography and mythology. Id. The Brahmin tradition mainly deals with
themes of gods and goddesses and magical symbols connected with deities. Id. This
school usually uses pigments on paper for their art. Id. The Tattoo-based paintings
reflect a more primitive art and create impact by a serial replication of the same image.
Id. The painting is originally in the form of a line-drawing and is divided into several
horizontal margins. Id.
53. See JAIN, supra note 51, at 24.
54. Id. at 31.
55. See, e.g., India Copyright Act, No. 14 (1957); India Code ch. 1 § 2(h) (1957)
(recognizing a fixation requirement by implication in defining “dramatic work” as “any
piece for recitation, choreographic work or entertainment in dumb show, the scenic
arrangement or acting form of which is fixed in writing or otherwise . . .”) (emphasis
added); see also id. Ch. 1 § 2(p) (defining “musical work” as “a work consisting of
music and includes any graphical notation of such work but does not include any words
or any action intended to be sung, spoken or performed with the music”) (emphasis
added).
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content of the song or stories is relatively unchanged through generations,
it does not have any fixed form. These oral works present another inherent
contradiction with modern copyright because one of the central tenets of
copyright law is that ideas and themes are not protected, but only the
expression thereof.56 Nor are artistic techniques protected by copyright.57
The Madhubani painting style or the special stitching technique of the
kantha weavers cannot be afforded copyright protection under the domestic
copyright law of India.
The problems posed by the fixation requirement in the copyright regime
are illustrated most starkly through cases of folk music expropriation. In
1954, the International Folk Music Council defined folk music on the basis
of three principles identified by Cecil Sharp, evolving from the properties
of oral transmission. The factors that determine the tradition of folk music
are (1) continuity of the present with the past, (2) variation emanating from
the creativity of the individual or group, and (3) selection by the
community that determines the forms in which the music develops.58
India has a rich repertoire of folk music, evident from the sheer variety
of musical forms in each region of India. Nearly all of the traditional and
indigenous Indian communities have their own distinct musical genre,
deriving unique characteristics from language, specific expressions,
themes, use of musical instruments, and musical styles. The distinctiveness
of folk songs derives from their regional specificity. Particular ethnic
groups within a geographical location have their own dialect, intonation,
and music style. Folk songs are created most often by the community as a
whole and are not authored by an individual.
There are two distinctive features of folk music: first, the lyrics and the
music of a song are set by the same person, and second, the music is
essentially communitarian. Folk songs are ever changing, but this change
must be brought about by the community itself, not by urban outsiders,
because the latter might lead to the distortion of such music. For example,
folk music uses certain instruments, and if they are changed to render the
56. This principle can be traced back to the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880), and is embodied today in the U.S. COPYRIGHT
ACT, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). On this point, the Supreme Court of India observed
that there can be no copyright protection for an idea, subject matter, thesis, plot, or
historical or legendary facts, and infringement of copyright in such cases is confined to
the form, manner, arrangement, and expression of the idea by the author of the
copyright protected work. See R.G. Anand v. M/S. Deluxe Films, A.I.R. 1978 S.C.
1613.
57. See Interlego A.G. v. Tyco Indus. Inc., [1989] A.C. 217 (P.C. 1988) (appeal
taken from H.K.) (holding that a piece must emanate from the author, and bear a
minimum amount of skill, labor, or judgment in order to meet the requirements of
“originality”).
58. H. BISWAS, LOK SANGIT SAMIKSHA: BANGLA O ASSAM 33 (A. Mukherjee &
Company Private Ltd. 1978).
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music urban and sophisticated, the rural flavor of such songs is distorted.59
While each region has distinctive forms, there is no watertight divide and,
more often than not, songs sung in one part of the region spread over time
to other neighboring areas. Various subtle changes occur in this process of
cultural exchange and assimilation, as most folk songs do not follow strict
codes of grammar and composition. Folk music thus reflects peoples’ lives
in all its shades, as well as the fluidity of culture.
Baul, Bhatiali, Bhawaiya, Jhumur, and Chotka are just a few among the
many musical forms that exist in the region of Bengal alone, and further
stylistic variations are found within each form. Baul songs are some of the
most popular folk songs prevalent in West Bengal and Bangladesh. Bauls
are a syncretic religious sect and come from the lower castes of Bengal.
Their songs use symbolism and have mainly a devotional character. The
Baul is like a wandering mendicant who goes around for alms. The songs
reflect spiritual quests and are a medium through which the Baul seeks
salvation. Even the love songs express more spiritual, rather than sensual,
love.60
Primarily the fishing communities of Bengal and Bangladesh sing
Bhatiali. They are songs of everyday joys and woes. Though it is sung in
these areas, the form, style, and intonation of the singing vary from one
locality to another, exemplifying the rich variation that exists in each genre
of folk music.61
Bhawaiya is prevalent in the Goalpara district of Assam, a northeastern
state of India; Jalpaiguri, Cooch Bihar, and West Dinajpur of West Bengal;
and the Rongpur, Dinajpur, and Mymensingh districts of Bangladesh.
Sorrow and pain of separation from loved ones are the central themes of
Bhawaiya songs. The rhythm of Bhawaiya is always very slow, and the
tune reflects the heart-wrenching pain of a woman separated from her
lover, which becomes the identifiable feature of these kinds of songs.
While most songs revolve around extramarital love, some songs also reflect
the woman’s love for her husband.
Like most folk music, the songs spread and develop through oral
transmission. Parts of one song are added to another, or a particular song is
changed or expanded.62 Jhumur songs, originally evolving from the Oraon
and Munda tribal communities of the Chotanagpur region of eastern India,
are very popular. Jhumur is also sung by the Oraon, Munda, Bhumija, and
Santhal tribals who worked as plantation laborers in the tea gardens of
59. Id. at 17-21.
60. Sanat Kumar Bose, Băul Songs of Bengal, 1 FOLKMUSIC & FOLKLORE 46, 48

(1967).
61. BISWAS, supra note 58, at 19.
62. See generally H. PAL, UTTAR BANGLAR LOKGEETI (Sanyal & Company 1973).
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Assam in eastern India, established by the British during the colonial
period. Accompanied by dance, these songs, with their fast rhythms, are
very popular even today, and many different variations of Jhumur are
prevalent.63 Chotka songs are based on fast rhythms and the themes are
mainly of humor, satire, and fun. They have a huge appeal in traditional
communities.64
Folk music is a reflection of the culture and development of any society.
For example, in patriarchal societies, women have very little say in
decision-making.
Their interests and opinions are marginalized
continuously. A number of folk songs in eastern India often reflect these
conditions. Sung from the perspective of a woman, these songs of love,
separation, and desire to fulfill an extramarital love affair protest against
patriarchal norms.65 The extramarital relations symbolize freedom from
strict social constraints.
While they are not a direct criticism of patriarchy, the love songs, in both
their erotic and non-erotic forms, are definitely a subversion of established
social normative values. However, few songs directly criticize the Hindu
female mythical figures of Sita, Sati, and Savitri, who are held in high
esteem for their archetypal roles as the ideal wife. Furthermore, not all
love songs sung by women in this region of India revolve around
extramarital love. There are some very passionate songs that reflect a
wife’s deep love for her husband.66
Though both women and men practice folk music, there are specific
songs sung only by women during various festivals and ceremonies.
Wedding ceremonies are a major occasion when women in groups create
songs. Women also create lyrics, set the tune, and sing various songs
during harvest seasons; these harvest season songs are mainly religious,
invoking the nature gods for better fertility and harvest. Songs of Hukum
Deo, or “worship,” are sung to invoke the rain god during times of drought
when women congregate in open fields and dance nude, their gestures
symbolic of the acts of sexual intercourse. The KatiPuja worship is
another ceremony to pray to the gods for begetting male sons as well as a
better harvest. Women exclusively perform all of these songs and male
entry is barred.67 A number of songs also reflect women’s protest against
the practice of giving dowry to the bridegroom during a wedding. The
articulation of protest by women against the institution of marriage takes
63. BISWAS, supra note 58, at 85.
64. H. Chakraborty, Introduction to H. Pal, supra note 62, xiv.
65. J. BAGCHI, ITIHASHER BIKKHANE: COOCH BIHAR O GOALPARAR LOKSANGEET

162 (Raktakarabi 2001).
66. K. DASGUPTA, MOR BANDHU KAJALBHOMRA 10-16 (Thema 2007).
67. BAGCHI, supra note 65, at 162-64.
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the form of complaints and condemnation of the bride against her parents,
the pain of being separated from the natal family on marriage, the sense of
being cheated when a young girl is married off to an old man, the distress
of a newly wed bride in her new home.68 Mainstream culture realizes the
enormous market potential for such music and the folk music industry now
has quite a lucrative market in India. While both men and women folk
singers are not given their due recognition, the plight of women singers is
far more pervasive. Several singers and music bands collect these songs,
and within a short span of time they are on the market with glossy CDs and
funky visual albums. Copyright laws in India provide no protection against
such misappropriation.69 Phrases are changed, new rhythms are set,
modifications are made, and the original music is repackaged in a new but
identifiable form.
While similar processes of exchange and fusion of music take place the
world over, the case of folk music misappropriation is significantly
different because of the multiple levels at which exploitation takes place.
Like several other TCEs in India, folk music originated in agrarian
economies, reflecting the lifestyles and concerns of the laboring masses.
While modern capitalism is not regarded as the ideal context for folk music
to develop and prosper, the folk music industry today seems to have a
strong hold in popular culture. From mainstream cinema to the urban folk
bands, the use of folk themes and music is made blatantly without any
recognition to the communities who developed the same. This has led to
the generation of what Eisler calls the “false folk music.”70 While the
genuine folk music was created several centuries ago by people themselves,
the false folk music arose much later in capitalism, and failed to reflect the
pleasure, pain, and struggle of the masses.
Rather, the modern
entertainment industry “borrowed” the idiom of such music and presented
it in a coarser and distorted form.71 Not only is this new form kitsch, most
68. BAGCHI, supra note 65, at 165-67; see also DASGUPTA, supra note 65, at 10-16.
69. See Star India Pvt. Ltd. v. Leo Burnett (India) Pvt. Ltd., (2003) 27 PTC 81, 94

(India) (holding that while in the case of reproduction of copyright-protected literary,
dramatic or artistic works, the existence of minor alterations or additions by the
defendant will not defeat the plaintiff’s claim of infringement). However, the High
Court of Bombay has held that the making of a film or sound recording despite
resembling completely a copyright-protected film or sound recording, would not
infringe copyright in the latter, provided it has not been made by a process of
duplication, that is, by using mechanical contrivance. Id. Therefore, if a sound
recording has been made by a person, mere resemblance to an earlier recording would
not amount to infringement of the latter. Id.
70. See HANNS EISLER, A REBEL IN MUSIC 98-99 (1978) (noting that there are two
types of folk songs, genuine and false, and that the genuine folk songs have extreme
value to a society’s culture).
71. See Chaplin v. Leslie Frewin (Publishers), Ltd., [1965] 3 All E.R. 764 (Ct. of
App.) (finding that the author’s right to prevent unauthorized derivations of the work or
adaptations that go beyond what was authorized, the “right of integrity,” has been

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2008

17

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 2

274

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 16:2

new urban folk music has destroyed the basic philosophy and spirit of the
genuine folk music. Several folk songs reflected struggles in addition to
direct and indirect protests of the working populace against exploitation by
landlords or middlemen. Recognizing its mass appeal and commercial
worth, the urban entertainment industry has appropriated such music.
Changes in lyrics and rhythms suited to the urban audience strip most of
the songs of their histories and politics of struggle. This hybridization
fossilizes folk music because songs are no longer meant to reflect concerns
of the traditional communities, but only to entertain.
The point is not to oppose creativity and borrowing of musical resources
by musicians and to reach out to a new audience in urban India. The
question is at what cost this is done? While the music industry reaps
substantial profits with reinventing folk music, there is absolutely no
recognition and acknowledgement of its sources. Music albums often cite
only the traditional musical form and there are no details of the community,
artist(s), or folk history of the songs or music. However, because the
original folk tune or song is rarely, if ever, recorded or embodied in any
material form, besides in the collective memory of the community that
created it, no action can be brought under the presently existing copyright
law of India. In keeping with international norms, copyright law in India
also requires that in order to be eligible for copyright protection the work
must be fixed in material or tangible form. Therefore, despite identifying
the problem, folkloric rights of indigenous musicians in India cannot be
safeguarded under the existing regime.
This leads us to the second level of misappropriation after nonacknowledgement, which is the absence of any economic returns to the
community. One could argue that because the community generates folk
music, it is difficult if not impossible to locate specific recipients of any
economic returns. For example, Bhatiali is a particular genre of folk song
that originated from the traditional fishing communities of West Bengal
and Bangladesh. If such a song is sung by an urban folk band or used as a
musical score in a film, is it possible to duly distribute economic returns to
the several fishing communities that developed it? Understanding that,
while determination of the community or specific recipients within it might
be an uphill task, hardly any such effort has been evidenced in India. Thus,
as folk music is put to commercial use in the entertainment industry, the
traditional and indigenous communities who are the owners of the specific
cultural expression remain unrecognized and devoid of any material
judicially recognized in the United Kingdom); see also Pasterfield v. Denham, [1999]
F.S.R. 168, 179 (CC (Plymouth)) (U.K.) (stating that to succeed in a claim for
derogatory treatment of a work, the author must establish that the treatment accorded to
the work was a distortion or mutilation that prejudices the reputation of the author; it is
insufficient that the author is merely aggrieved by such treatment).
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returns.
Finally, at the third level is the question of moral rights violation.72 It is
not enough to pay monetary compensation to the community—which is
hardly ever done, in any case—and then use their music indiscriminately.
There is a need to delineate the difference between improvisation of folk
and its distortion. As discussed earlier, to de-historicize and deny the
fluidity of folk music is tantamount to distortion. The urban middle class
audience appreciates such music as presented to them in its new form and
package but they hardly have any links, a sense of belonging or resonance,
with the traditional communities who evolved the music. Thus, traditional
or indigenous communities remain the exotic “other,” the faceless masses
with whom the urban elite or middle class have no connection. This
disjunction between people and their culture is dehumanizing and raises
ethical questions. Is it not an imperative on the part of the music industry to
protect the cultural and intellectual property of traditional and indigenous
communities, and to morally and materially recognize their contribution to
our rich musical folklore notwithstanding the several hurdles in the social
and legal determination of such communities?
D. Duration of Protection
In determining the duration of protection, copyright law seeks to balance
two public interests. The first is encouraging innovation through the
creation of new works, while the second involves making such works
accessible to the public to the widest possible extent, thus implying that the
work in due course should fall into the public domain.73 Traditionally, the
term of copyright protection for a work covered by the law varies among
jurisdictions, but is normally life and an additional fifty to seventy years.74
It is pertinent to note that the period of protection as well as the way in
which the term of protection is calculated changes according to the nature

72. See India Copyright Act, No. 14 of 1957; India Code (1957), § 57(a)-(b)
(recognizing the moral rights of the author of a work, through the rights of paternity
and integrity, and allowing an author: (1) to claim authorship of the work; and (2) to
restrain or claim damages in respect of any distortion, mutilation, modification, or other
act in relation to the work which is done before the expiration of the term of the
copyright, if such distortion is prejudicial to the honor or reputation of such author).
73. See LIONEL BENTLEY & BRAD SHERMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 14246 (2d ed. 2004).
74. See India Copyright Act, No. 14 of 1957; India Code (1957), §§ 22-29
(prescribing the term of protection for each kind of work: in case of literary, dramatic,
musical, or artistic work (other than a photograph), when published within the lifetime
of the author, copyright subsists during the lifetime of the author until sixty years from
the beginning of the calendar year next following the year in which the author dies; in
cases of anonymous works and posthumous works, the term is sixty years from the
beginning of the calendar year next following the year in which the work is first
published).
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of the work in question. This is a reflection of the fact that different
interests and policy concerns arise with different categories of works.
However, considering the cultural and religious significance of ancestral
indigenous designs and folklore, which have been created through
thousands of years of accumulated knowledge, this is an entirely
insignificant duration. As a consequence of this limitation in copyright law,
members of traditional communities responsible for developing and
sustaining expressions of folklore like kantha-stitch, Madhubani art, or folk
music, who in the traditional context would be the owner of such cultural
property, gradually are becoming culturally dispossessed and impoverished
to the point that they may even need to seek permission to use or have
access to traditional cultural expressions once owned or created by their
ancestors.75 Therefore, it is apparent that the existing regime of intellectual
property protection is insufficient to safeguard traditional cultural
expressions, keeping in mind the socio-cultural variations between the
Western and indigenous communities in mind.
IV. RECOGNIZING WOMEN’S INTERESTS WITHIN TRADITIONAL
COMMUNITIES: THE INDIAN CONTEXT
This section analyzes the extent to which intellectual property and
human rights laws protect interests, rights, and control of women over their
cultural property. Cultural feminism argues that there are differences
between the masculine and feminine ways of reasoning.76 According to
Donovan, contemporary cultural feminists believe that women’s world
views create the basis for a more humane collective world view that can
resist destructive and individualistic masculine ideologies.77 Shiva argues
that women in India are connected intrinsically to nature and are the
providers of sustenance. Their role in preserving nature and acting as
caregivers to the community has a historical and cultural, not merely a
biological, basis.78
Contemporary cultural feminism is far more
sophisticated and has moved far beyond the assumption of a reformist and
pacifist nature of women as understood by the nineteenth century cultural
feminists.79
In the legal context, cultural feminism calls for the
75. See, e.g., Puri, supra note 32, at 526-27 (highlighting the problems caused by
the limited copyright protection that dispossesses descendents of their ancestors’
creations as a reason to extend copyright protection in perpetuity).
76. REBECCA COOK, HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES 5-6 (1994).
77. See JOSEPHINE DONOVAN, FEMINIST THEORY: THE INTELLECTUAL TRADITIONS
77 (Continuum Int’l Publishing, 3d ed. 2000) (1985).
78. VANDANA SHIVA, THE WOMEN, GENDER AND DEVELOPMENT READER 62
(Nalini Visvanathan ed., Zed Books 1997).
79. See DONOVAN, supra note 77, at 77.
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identification of a distinctive women’s voice and a re-evaluation of the
contribution it can make to legal doctrine.80 Such an approach enables the
law to move beyond a formal non-discrimination model and recognize
women’s differential location in society. This celebration of differences,
however, may lead to a marginalization of women’s rights. On one hand it
can lead to a reassertion of women’s location in the private sphere, but on
the other it can mean that their needs are different from men and hence
entitled to lesser resources. The creation of a specialized branch of
“women’s rights” within human rights discourse has also led to a
ghettoization of women’s rights as “mainstream” human rights law tends to
ignore a gendered understanding of human rights violations or fails to
apply human rights norms to condemn atrocities against women.81
The previous sections have demonstrated the lack of any domestic legal
regime in India that could protect the cultural rights of traditional and
indigenous communities. It is further argued that even if the intellectual
property rights regime protected TCEs, traditional knowledge and cultural
expressions of women would still remain unrecognized. The reason is twofold. A feminist understanding of traditional and rural Indian communities
would reveal their patriarchal nature. Elderly males represent most
communities in India, silencing women’s voices and undermining their
contributions. Women’s cultural expressions have no specific recognition
within the communities. Within the traditional communities of eastern
India, the kantha industry is conceived merely as a workable employment
avenue and not necessarily a cultural expression protected and developed
by women. On the other hand, Madhubani and women’s folk music is
simply symbolic of women’s participation in the religious and cultural life
of the community and considered as a “natural” extension of their gendered
roles. Communities may be unprepared to accord the status of artists to
their women. Coupled with a patriarchal social set up, the world view of a
communitarian existence is in conflict with the idea of individual
recognition, more so when the recipients of such recognition are women.
This is not to deny that over a course of time, with some state intervention
to protect the rich cultural heritage of several communities in India, a few
women have been recognized as Madhubani artists or folk singers. But on
the whole women’s contribution to the protection and maintenance of

80. Hilary Charlesworth, What Are “Women’s International Human Rights”?, in
HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 65
(Rebecca Cook ed., 1994) (stating that this area of legal feminism is the counterpart for
other disciplines, such as feminist theology and women’s literature).
81. See HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 218 (2000) (highlighting that the
specialization of women’s rights within the field of human rights has made protection
of women a lower priority in the mainstream human rights discourse).
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cultural heritage is not given its due recognition. In such a scenario, if
intellectual property rights seem to be a solution, the feasibility and
suitability of such a regime does remain a question. Even if the intellectual
property rights regime ensured economic returns to the community, women
would have little control over the economic benefits in a deeply
hierarchical and patriarchal society.
Secondly, intellectual property regimes are often based on values of
individualism and competition operating primarily in a market economy.
Often understood as masculine values, most women, especially in rural
India, would hardly subscribe to these values and would not possibly think
of using the law upholding individual or corporate claims to protect their
individual rights. To use a cultural feminist approach, in a cultural context
where women’s lives are primarily relational, an individualistic claim over
resources is perhaps not the ideal mechanism to acknowledge and
safeguard the contributions and interests of women within their
communities. Presently there is no recognition of authorship, authenticity,
and economic returns to the community within the existing intellectual
property regime in India. Even if India created a workable intellectual
property regime protecting such traditional cultural expressions by
establishing a moral obligation on part of individuals and companies that
use TCEs, it is doubtful whether women would benefit from such legal
developments. Even if we assume that a strong intellectual property regime
would ensure economic returns to the community, there is little guarantee
that women would be able to control the process.
A human rights perspective is better equipped to recognize the
economic, social, and cultural rights of indigenous peoples and traditional
artisan communities than a narrow framework of intellectual property
rights. Traditional and indigenous communities in India face double
marginalization due to the lack of any intellectual property regime
protecting traditional knowledge and cultural expressions and the nonrecognition of indigenous populations by the Indian state. For women, the
marginalization greatly increases. While the intellectual property regime
has limited applicability in the protection of women’s cultural expressions,
the mainstream human rights framework also fails to reflect a gender
perspective; as a result the interests of women in indigenous communities
are neglected even further. Traditional human rights law is based on a
formal non-discrimination model that does not take the structural
disadvantages of women into account. Human rights law has been
primarily operative in the public sphere while most women’s lives take
place in the private sphere where significant human rights violations take
place, resulting in a lack of understanding of the systemic nature of
subordination of women in human rights law. This failure to characterize
the subordination of women as a human rights violation leads to a
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lackadaisical approach on the part of the State to condemn discrimination
against women.82 Feminists have argued that while advocacy and
campaigns for legal rights is an important strategy, it is imperative to go
beyond this demand and address structural inequalities of power.
Charlesworth argues
women’s experiences and concerns are not easily translated in to the
narrow, individualistic language of rights; rights discourse overly
simplifies complex power relations and their promise may be thwarted
by structural inequalities of power; the balancing of “competing” rights
by decision-making bodies often reduces women’s power . . . .83

According to Coomaraswamy, the women’s rights discourse in south
Asia is weak. Poor implementation coupled with a lack of awareness
prevents the rights machinery from becoming a viable tool for the
empowerment of women.84 More importantly, rights discourse is often
considered to be a Western hegemonizing dialogue and has little resonance
in the cultural context of south Asian societies. International debates over
universality of rights language between the global north and certain
countries of south Coomaraswamy warns us against the “orientalist trap” of
two kinds of binaries—the first is that of the progressive, individualistic
West vis-à-vis the backward East and the second is the reverse argument of
the communitarian, non-adversarial and therefore superior Eastern cultures
that do not uphold individualistic concepts of rights. Coomaraswamy
asserts that the prevalence of both traditions of mediation and
reconciliation, as well as adversarial systems in South Asian societies85 go
a long way to strengthen a culture of women’s rights. However, in a
context where there is ideological and social resistance to “rights culture,”
articulating social and economic demands in terms of rights might be
extremely difficult for women. All these factors are impediments in
claiming moral and material returns for cultural creativity of women. For
women who create the kantha, Madhubani, or folk music, these
expressions are intrinsic to their survival as a community. Individual
82. See DONOVAN, supra note 77, at 4-15; see also Charlesworth, supra note 80, at
60-64 (arguing that the formulation of equal rights may be a useful first step towards
improving the position of women).
83. See Charlesworth, supra note 80, at 61 (stating that a continuing focus on
achieving more rights may not be beneficial to women due to androcentic
construction).
84. See Radhika Coomaraswamy, To Bellow Like a Cow: Women, Ethnicity, and
the Discourse of Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 41-42 (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994) (remarking that it is
important to adapt international conventions so they resonate with the anthropological
reality in Asian societies so they can be used to improve the rights of women).
85. See id. (identifying that the approach to women’s rights is often couched in
ambiguity in the Asian world by both assuming and denying responsibility for the
mistreatment of women at the same time).
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recognition as artists is often inconceivable for these women. The point is
not to argue for individual artistic recognition, but to realize the worth and
potential of women as chief custodians and creators of traditional cultural
expressions that is undermined by the patriarchal societal structures of the
family and community, the market that expropriates traditional knowledge
and cultural expressions, and finally the mainstream legal system that
remain gender insensitive in its garb of gender neutrality.
For many poor indigenous communities in India, life is an everyday
struggle for survival. In a situation of complete absence of intellectual
property laws, expropriation of their knowledge and cultural expressions
has absolutely no legal remedy. Establishing an intellectual property
regime that would adequately protect these communities is necessary. But
a mere set of new laws would be of little relevance without an in-depth
understanding of the power dynamics in society. An intellectual property
regime tailor-made for the benefit of corporations is incapable of protecting
indigenous rights. Incorporation of a human rights perspective within the
intellectual property regime is essential if the rights of traditional and
indigenous communities are to be upheld. However, as argued earlier,
neither regime reflect a gendered understanding. While some feminist
critiques of the rights discourse are available,86 “mapping the
connections”87 between gender and intellectual property is rare. Therefore,
it is not enough to simply argue for the creation of an intellectual property
regime in India, but to first assess its ability to adequately protect rights of
traditional and indigenous communities. It is also important to understand
the multiple layers of exploitation within the family, the community, by the
state, and by the market that prevent women from claiming social,
economic, and cultural rights. This is not to imply that rural and
indigenous women are victims without any agency, but to recognize the
wide gap between the existing intellectual property and human rights
regimes, and their dissonance with the experiences in which women live
their lives.
V. CONCLUSION
The international intellectual property regime in place today reflects a
purely Western understanding of authorship and ownership of intellectual
property, valuing individual rights above collective or group rights. It is
based entirely on Anglo-Saxon principles, consequently seeking to ensure
economic interests at the cost of cultural interests. Domestic legislations
86. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 84; GENDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Karen Knop ed., 2004).
87. See “IP/Gender: The Unmapped Connections,” Conference held by the
American University, Washington College of Law (Mar. 2007).
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based on this system are similarly ill-equipped at ensuring the protection of
TCEs within the national framework. In the Indian context, the Copyright
Act of 1957 is conceptually inadequate to secure the intellectual property
rights of traditional communities that are repositories of folklore, and is
failing miserably in protecting these communities from daily expropriation
of their cultural and intellectual property. In light of the blank canvas that
presently exists in the area of statutory protection of folklore in India,
specific legislation to safeguard traditional knowledge and traditional
cultural expressions is essential.
However, the creation of a regulatory framework in the statute books is
merely the first step of many. The establishment of an effective
institutional framework accompanied by widespread societal change is
needed if traditional communities like the kantha weavers, Madhubani
painters, or custodians of folk music are to be accorded meaningful
protection within the Indian legal system, particularly in cases where the
rights of women are at stake. For this, there is an urgent need to set up an
autonomous institution in India with members ranging from art experts,
academicians, policy consultants, lawyers, women, and human rights
activists to members from civil society who could draw up a holistic plan
with a gender focus to protect economic and cultural rights of traditional
communities, with specific reference to women. Neither the state nor the
private players in the national and global markets could be expected to
honestly and efficiently uphold and entrench such rights.
Guaranteeing economic and social rights for women is crucial to the
survival of traditional artisan communities and the folkloric works they
develop and maintain. Further, it is important to make the linkages
between the intellectual property rights of authorship and recognition of
TCEs specifically created and sustained by women and the economic
benefits that could accrue to women through such recognition. As has
emerged clearly from this paper, neither the intellectual property regime
nor the human rights discourse can, in isolation, provide a tailor-made
solution to prevent exploitation of traditional communities.
The
intellectual property regime in its present form entirely excludes the human
rights paradigm, while the human rights discourse, in turn, remains malecentric, thereby failing to protect the interests of women within indigenous
communities. It is essential, therefore, to develop an intellectual property
regime that incorporates a gendered human rights discourse to ensure the
economic and social empowerment of women in such communities.
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